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At the Center for Value Sociology o f the Institute o f Sociology, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences a number o f surveys have been 
carried out since the late 1970s in order to describe and analyse 
the value priorities and the structure of the value system o f the 
country, and to map and explain its changes. The research was 
directed by Elemer Hankiss, the surveys were organised by Robert 
Manchin and Laszlo Fiistos, while the analyses were done by 
Hankiss, Manchin, Fiistos, and Szakolczai. (1) In the surveys, a 
number o f value tests have been used. Some were developed on 
the basis on in-depth interviews in Hungary - these were used 
mostly in the first, 1977 survey, though a child-rearing principles 
test that proved to be the most revealing was repeated in 1982. 
Others included widely used, international value sets. These were 
the Rokeach-test o f basic human values, the Inglehart-test of 
materialist and post-materialist values, one child-rearing 
principles tests developed by Melvin Cohn, and another by the 
European Value System Study Group. (2) Of all these, 
notwithstanding the number o f critical comments voiced against 
it, the Rokeach-test proved to be by far the most useful.
Apart from a few internal reports based mostly on the findings of 
the 1978 survey, for various reasons the results have not be 
analysed so far in depth, and were not made publicly available. 
(3) The aim o f this paper is to present at least some preliminary 
findings, before an exhaustive, study o f the results will become 
possible.
2. On the concept o f values
This paper will not discuss the different approaches to the study 
o f values - a topic better suited for a whole book. Only a 
preliminary, working definition will be given, in order to situate 



























































































-  2 -
In the conceptual framework which provides the background to 
this research, a value is first o f all something that effectively 
governs the conduct o f human beings: what they do (or not do), 
and how they act in their daily existence. There are a number of 
things that fit this broad description: interests, norms, customs, 
rules, laws, including even physical laws. (4) But o f the many 
such possibilities, values have two additional characteristics. First, 
they are never reducible completely to external determining 
factors or causes, whether given in terms o f social positions, 
objective interests, or cultural norms. A value is something that 
also puts freedom in the play: where individuals have a degree o f 
freedom concerning the type o f activity and the kind of strategy 
they decide to follow. In other words, values can never be 
imputed completely from the outside. But, second, they are 
accessible, through reasoning and reflection, from the inside. A 
value is not in impulse or an intuition that suddenly and 
inexplicably leads the individual to certain acts, beyond rational 
discourse, but the assessment, evaluation, putting into the balance 
one's own freedom to act by the use o f one's own reasoning, o f 
logos . We can only talk about actions being guided by values to 
the extent that they contain thought, whether an activity o f 
thinking was explicitly connected to the given action, or that it 
contained a particular line o f thought done before or simply 
assumed and taken for granted. The crucial point is that through 
reflection, this element o f thought becomes accessible, can be 
spelled out; and to the extent that we are talking about values, 
this will be an end, a resting point o f explanation. In a particular 
context, the individual's conduct is guided by a value if he or she 
had a degree o f freedom to act in a certain situation, and if this 
freedom was effectively used by the pursuit o f a certain line o f 
action which one could defend by a reasoning based upon ultimate 
principles with which the individual affirms and manifests his 
personal identity. It is by reaching this moment o f personal 
identification that this type o f reasoned explanation arrives at a 
resting point beyond which it is not possible to go.
This approach to the concept o f values implies two things. First, it 
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for the description o f traditional communities, where between the 
rules or customs guiding individual conduct and the concrete 
actions o f individuals, there is a high degree o f continuity and 
taken for grantedness; where individual members are not allowed 
to argue or reason about the way they act, or could not even 
conceive o f such an activity. But the approach holds forcefully 
true for the so-called totalitarian societies. Paradoxically, one o f 
the most oppressive characteristics o f modern totalitarian 
regimes, that they require an explicit acknowledgement and 
support o f the regime by the individuals themselves, has as a 
latent and lasting effect the promotion o f the idea that a certain 
state o f affairs has to be defended or justified, therefore increases 
the emphasis on reasoning, and thus contributes to its own 
demise. But this point also holds true for the other way as well. 
Individuals may well decide to tell lies when asked about their 
values, or the reasons for their conduct. But the very act o f giving 
reasons has an impact on the exact relationship between the 
individual and the values he/ she is using in guiding conduct; 
leaves a mark on his identity, being. In this framework, by its 
uttering, by the retroactive effect it has on the speaking subject, a 
lie becomes a reality, and therefore will have a certain element of 
truth. The approach according to which opinion polls on values are 
unreliable in a not democratic situation as they do not reveal the 
true preferences is simplistic. Basic human values are not matters 
o f opinions that may change every day. It cannot be assumed that 
two persons could have identical values, only their willingness to 
express is different. Such a willingness or modality o f expression 
is an internal part o f one’s value system itself.
Second, the idea according to which values define the way 
individuals assess the stakes and make use o f their freedom does 
not mean that the full weight o f freedom and reflection (thinking) 
is actually made use o f continuously. In one's daily life, it is very 
rare that an action actually involves explicit thinking about 
alternatives, or the expression o f concrete values. These do 
happen in certain moments, but then the results o f such moments 
become taken for granted. Values, therefore, have a dual 
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innovation, imagination, and change; they are the most active, 
mobile elements o f human conduct, as opposed to the static and 
mechanical concept o f interests, and the deterministic concepts o f 
impulses, urges, instincts. On the other, they are covered by vast 
layers o f habits, taken for granted, routine activities and forms of 
behaviour, therefore also provide stability and continuity, a high 
degree o f resistibility' to change.
Values, therefore, are a particularly suitable topic for the study of 
major socio-political transformations. Such events not only 
provide opportunities, but in a sense make it imperative for 
individuals o f stepping back from the way they lived so far, of 
reflecting on their own activities, and o f using their reason in 
order to adjust their behaviour and to reorganise the system of 
values that ultimately govern their conduct. The extent to which 
such a reorganisation does in fact takes place Is a fundamental 
question in order to study a crucial point in all transitions: the 
combination o f continuity' and discontinuity. Apart from simply 
describing the changes, a study o f the actual change o f value 
priorities or the structure o f the value system can also help us to 
evaluate the changes, and to diagnostise possible reasons for the 
failure o f taking up certain opportunities. Understood in this 
sense, changes in value preferences are not simply pale mirrors of 
the "actual, real" processes going on in society, but have an 
irreducible, and even fundamental role in fuelling, accelerating, 
and slowing down; o f guiding or perhaps misleading the changes.
(5)
3. Data and hypotheses
In this paper only the results o f the Rokeach-test will be analysed. 
This test for the study' o f basic human values was developed by 
the American social psychologist Milton Rokeach. (6) Through a 
long series o f experiments, Rokeach developed a set o f 18 
terminal and 18 instrumental values which according to him 
reproduce the most important value orientations, spanning the 
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life goals or desirable end-states, while the instrumental values 
the means that can be ordered to the attainment o f these goals. 
Individuals are asked to rank, separately, the 18 terminal and 
instrumental values. The full set is contained in the Appendix.
Data are available for four national representative surveys that all 
administered the Rokeach test in 1978, 1982, 1990, and 1993. (7) 
All four observation points are from highly relevant periods. The 
first captures the system at a moment in time when most o f the 
mechanisms that were functioning for decades were to a large 
extent still intact. This was the moment when the reforms 
progressed to the point that the administration o f a national 
representative survey containing such questions was possible (it 
was officially permitted, and one could expect reasonable 
responses), but when the structure o f the value system still could 
reflect the full impact o f the system. By 1982, the erosion o f the 
former system started in a much larger scale. The offensive 
against the reforms came to a halt, and new economic measures 
were introduced that made the changes ever more clearly 
irreversible. In fact, a third observation around the middle o f the 
1980s would have been very useful to assess the scope o f 
changes, but for various reasons, no survey was done at that 
point. Instead, we have results for the Autumn of 1990, just in the 
year of political changes; and finally for September 1993, which is 
the present, and includes the experience o f the first post­
communist years.
The paper will not test operational hypotheses about changes in 
value preferences and structures. The possibility o f modelling will 
be explored later, when value changes will be linked to 
sociological background variables. For the moment, the aim is only 
to describe and interpret the shift in the values themselves.
The analysis will be guided by four broad questions. The first 
concerns the degree o f smoothness in the changes throughout the 
15-year time-period. It is a commonplace that in Hungary, the 
shift from the old regime to the new happened without major 
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is confirmed by the data on values, and what are the kind o f 
values that did change in such a gradual way. Second, one may 
wonder whether the opposite scenario would not hold true for 
certain values; whether some trends started in the old regime 
persist even under new conditions. Third, apart from these issues 
o f continuity, particular emphasis will be laid on searching for the 
values for whom 1990 represented a clear break. The question is 
whether this break is restricted mostly to the formal, ideological 
aspects o f the former regime, or whether we could establish other 
clear breaks concerning the way people conduct themselves and 
perceive the others. Finally, fourth, the question is whether in 
between 1990 and 1993, we can document the start o f any 
significant new trends; or whether apart from the questions of 
continuity' and stability in trends, preferences, and structures, 
there are even certain returns to former ways o f acting and 
thinking.
The concrete analysis will focus on two issues. First, it will assess 
the changes in the value priorities in Hungary between 1978 and 
1993. This will be done by a simple analysis o f changes in means, 
using t-tests. (8) Second, with the help o f factor analysis, it will 
assess whether there were major dislocations in the structure o f 
value preferences during the given time period.
4, Changes in value preferences
Figures 1 and 2 show the average selection o f the 18 terminal and 
instrumental values, respectively, for the four time periods. What 
first meets the eye is the high degree o f stability in value 
preferences throughout the whole time period. In spite o f the fact 
that changes are visible, the overall impression is much more one 
o f stability. This confirms two things at the same time: the validity' 
o f the measuring instruments, and also the expectation that the 
systemic change did not lead to a major, overall reorganisation of 
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Both points are further confirmed by the high degree o f stability 
o f a number o f individual values (see Table 2, and also Figures 1 
and 2). In one-third o f all the values, there were no significant 
changes during the 15 years span; in most cases, not change at all 
between any o f the four survey years. (9) These eleven values 
can be divided into four blocks, o f which three is highly 
homogenous: ethical values (COURAGEOUS, RESPONSIBLE, HONEST); 
hedonistic values .(EXCITING LIFE, PLEASURE, CHEERFUL, 
FRIENDSHIP); religious values (SALVATION, FORGIVING); and 
finally a rather mixed group o f autonomy values (FREEDOM, 
CAPABLE). There is nothing surprising in the stability o f the first 
two groups that simply reproduce the basic framework of the 
value system in any industrial society: the high and stable 
importance of values defining moral conduct, and the low priority 
assigned to the sheer enjoyment o f life. The second half o f the 
results is less obvious. First, it is quite surprising that the two 
most explicitly religious values did not go up in importance 
between 1978 and 1993. SALVATION remained the rock-bottom 
value for the Hungarian population. This is a significant finding 
even if this is more a Protestant than a catholic value, and even if 
in Hungarian, it can be confused with salutation if one is careless.
(10) The case o f FORGIVING is even stranger, because this value, 
already marginal in Hungary compared to other countries, was 
still steadily losing importance, even if the losses were smaller.
(11) Finally, it is also not evident that the autonomy values that 
were relatively unimportant in Hungary in the 1970s and 1980s 
should remain so in the 1990s.
Another pattern is given by values manifesting a steady, 
continuous change. In one sense, it is the opposite o f stability; but, 
in other sense, this also shows a certain continuity between the 
two systems: continuity in the sense of gradual change, as opposed 
to a radical break, a discontinuity. First, there was a steady, 
significant increase in the importance of four values: WISDOM, 
IMAGINATIVE, INTELLECTUAL, and LOGICAL. The four together 
clearly define a process o f intellectualisation. Concerning the first, 
the relative increase in importance occurred against a very low 
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was different. Already in our 1983 study, one o f the major finding 
was that compared to the United States, Hungarian society showed 
a high degree o f individualisation and intellectualisation. (12) 
There, it was connected to the special kind o f socialist 
modernisation, the high emphasis put on formal education and the 
role o f intellectuals that was characteristic o f the formal system. It 
would have been reasonable to expect that after the changes, this 
trend had been reversed. In fact, the exact opposite happened. 
Such a purely mental property as LOGICAL went up nine places in 
the rank order o f 18 by 1993, passing over such values as 
INDEPENDENT, CHEERFUL, LOVING, or POLITE; while 
INTELLECTUAL, being one o f the lasts in the American value 
system in 1968, by 1993 became the most important instrumental 
value for Hungarians, ahead even o f the moral-ethical values. We 
should also emphasise that though the changes for these four 
values were monotonous between the four years, the greatest 
upsurge happened after the changes, between 1990 and 1993.
This shift o f importance in certain values was counterbalanced by 
a steady decline in others. These could be divided in two groups. 
The first gives the reverse side o f intellectualisation: a decrease in 
values related to interpersonal relations, sociability, or communal 
life. This concerns partly FORGIVING, where the changes were 
small between the neighbouring years, but became almost 
significant by 1993; and especially HELPFUL, that in the late 
1970s was the only value related to human interaction still as 
highly appreciated in Hungary as in the US. By 1993, even this has 
been altered, HELPFUL being the only instrumental value that 
significantly lost importance from year to year.
There was another set o f values that also steadily lost importance, 
and where the systemic change represented an acceleration: these 
are WORK, SELF-RESPECT, and to some extent SOCIAL 
RECOGNITION (here, the major break is between 1982 and 1990). 
Both the semantics o f the terms and our earlier studies confirm 
that this is a relatively homogenous group, related to a special 
socialist type o f value system, oriented more to traditional social- 
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With the last, SOCIAL RECOGNITION, we can turn to those values 
that seem to be the most revealing for our special purpose: where 
the crucial change happened definitely, and in a discontinuous 
manner, with the systemic change. However, there are not many 
such cases. Apart from SOCIAL RECOGNITION, where even before 
the changes, there was a significant loss o f importance, there were 
only two whose importance dropped radically and for good in 
1990. These are EQUALITY and OBEDIENT: values who had very 
strong link not only to socialist or official communist ideology, but 
also to its everyday practice. Correspondingly, there were two 
values whose importance went up: WELL-BEING and HAPPINESS.
These results concerning the link between value change and 
systemic change are meager and trivial: the importance o f values 
that were most exposed in the old system and closest to its 
everyday practice went down, while the values connected to 
material well-being, due to the increased insecurity and the 
economic problems went up. But there is another type o f change 
linked more peculiarly to the year of the transition: a set o f values 
in the assessment o f which there is a definite shift in 1990, but 
where by 1993, the change disappears, and the importance o f the 
value returns to the earlier level; values for which 1990 was more 
o f a disturbance than a radical change.
First, there are two values whose importance decreased very 
significantly between 1982 and 1990, but that, by 1993, not only 
regained their earlier levels, but even advanced beyond it: these 
are PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY. These values had a specific 
meaning in the Hungarian context. In the former system, these 
were the most important terminal values o f the population at 
large; values whose importance largely overpasses that in the 
United States; values that can easily be associated with the official 
socialist value system, its closed and paranoid character. The 
connection between the official value system and these values 
was also confirmed by empirical evidence. For those who were 
Communist party members, especially those who also completed 
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important than for the population at large. (13) Therefore, these 
were the actual, official ideological values o f existing socialism, 
and not the social democratic values of work, recognition by other, 
and self-respect.
With the collapse o f the system, the importance o f this ideology 
considerably diminished, but by 1993, the trend was reversed. 
The data clearly show a new kind of ideological mobilisation, but 
this time dissociated from the classical socialist one, as the values 
that were specifically socialist in theory or practice (EQUALITY, 
WORK, OBEDIENT) did not gain additional importance. Such an 
interpretation is confirmed by a value that lies in between the 
two different shifts, SOCIAL RECOGNITION. This value, like the 
other social democratic values, clearly lost importance throughout 
the last 15 years; but, after the changes, there are signs o f a 
certain reversal o f the trends - as if it were increasingly detaching 
itself from the social democratic-socialist value system, and 
reconnect itself more with the values that are "ideological" 
perhaps as a matter o f deeper mentality, and not connected to any 
single partisan belief.
The peculiar shifts in the ideological values also have their exact 
counterpart in the movement o f three other values: FAMILY 
SECURITY, INNER HARMONY, and LOVE. These values form the 
semantic opposite o f the official socialist-ideological values, and 
were the values most associated with the non-party member 
parts o f the population, especially intellectuals. The fact that their 
importance went up after the changes is therefore not surprising. 
But that only a few years later, they practically resumed their 
earlier level, is more difficult to explain, and may also be more 
disconcerting.
The rest o f the values followed courses that are more difficult to 
interpret without further, structural analysis. There were a set o f 
values where 1982 represented an unsustained change. Thus, the 
importance o f SELF-CONTROLLED, CLEAN, and POLITE went up, 
that o f LOVING went down in 1982, but by 1993, they resumed 
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but with no return; these are AMBITIOUS and INDEPENDENT. 
Contrary to all expectations, from the 1980s, with the onset o f the 
new wave o f reforms, these are exactly the pragmatic, action- and 
well-being oriented instrumental values that are losing their 
importance. Finally, one value, BROADMINDED had a unique and 
puzzling trajectory. Its average rank went up significantly from 
1978 to 1982, but suffered a very serious loss between 1982 and 
1990, and finally, by 1990, resumed its original, 1978 level.
5. Changes in the structure o f the value system
So far, only changes in the relative importance o f individual 
values were analysed, though attention was being paid to the way- 
different values were moving together, and in the interpretation 
of such moves, we made implicit use o f the results o f earlier work. 
The aim now is to study directly changes in the structure o f the 
value system. Such a study is to be pursued on three different 
levels. At the first, it must reflect a basic continuity, as the 
structure o f the value system of a whole society cannot change 
completely overnight, even with a change o f the socio-political 
system. At the second, it must show some patterns o f change that 
are easily intelligible, and reflect the obvious change happening in 
Hungary in the last 15 years. It is only at the third level that the 
empirical concrete results could be o f value, once they are 
confirmed by the first two steps; when they give us some precise 
information about the timing, direction and strength o f the 
expected changes; and perhaps could even offer us new 
information that could not have been obtained by other means.
The method used was factor analysis. (14) The data showed the 
existence o f five common factors for 1978, six for 1982, and seven 
for 1990 and 1993 respectively. (15) These factors together 
explained around 22% o f the total variance in each year which, 
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The original, unrotated factors indicate the most important 
dividing lines concerning value choices in the population, as 
measured by the amount o f variance explained. This gives 
important information as far as the first few such divisions are 
concerned. However, after the first few factors, the relative 
differences in explained variances being minor anyway, the 
interpretation of the actual factors is much helped by rotation. 
With the help o f this procedure, we can get a clearer view o f the 
most important systematic contrasts characteristic o f the whole 
structure o f the variables, as rotation defines each individual 
factor simultaneously, on the basis o f all the information 
contained in the preserved factor structure, and eliminates the 
arbitrariness o f the recursive method used for the specification of 
the original factors. Therefore, only the first three unrotated 
factors will be interpreted, and a more detailed analysis will be 
made of all rotated factors after.
5.1. The unrotated factors
The first factor defines the most important cleavage concerning 
the choice o f values for the population at large, and separates 
therefore the two most distinct groups o f values (see table 3). The 
results show again a combination o f fundamental continuity, and a 
very strong and definite change. In all four years, the factor 
defines an opposition between intellectual instrumental values on 
the one hand, and values related to interpersonal relations on the 
other. But there is a basic difference: the ideological values are 
strongly present, together with the intellectuals values, on one 
pole o f the factor in 1978; their presence becomes considerably 
weaker by 1982, and in the 1990s, they practically leave the 
factor. Though, even here, there are indications o f a swing: in 
1990, most o f the ideological values (PEACE, EQUALITY, 
NATIONAL SECURITY) almost appear in the opposite pole o f the 
factor; while in 1993, they are again on the same pole with the 
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Among the intellectual values, there is also a definite internal 
reorganisation. While in 1978, the factor contained together 
values that were more strictly related to mental capacities, and of 
ethical and pragmatic characteristics, the importance o f these 
latter definitely declined in the factor in later years.
The changes in the relationship between the (terminal) ideological 
and (instrumental) intellectual values are mirrored in the other 
pole o f the factor. In 1978 and to a smaller extent in 1982, this 
pole contains a combination of instrumental values that are more 
traditional, related to interpersonal relations and community life, 
and a set o f terminal values concerned with a comfortable and 
easy life. The latter set drops out o f the factor in the 1990s. The 
first set is stable, with minor oscillations.
First, the two values that define most steadily this factor pole 
throughout the years are FORGIVING and LOVING; values where 
the emphasis is much less on external, traditional or disciplinary 
constraints on behaviour, but on interpersonal relations; on 
making such relations more relaxed and rewarding. The 
opposition, therefore, that characterises most the polarisation, the 
division, the divergence among the value choices o f Hungarians in 
this relatively long, 15-year time period, is the contrast of 
IMAGINATIVE and LOGICAL vs. FORGIVING and LOVING. Second, 
another compact set o f values steadily present in the factor are 
POLITE, CLEAN, and OBEDIENT; values that can be best termed 
disciplinary, related to the external controls imprinted and 
enforced in the population at large by the spread o f courtly 
techniques of behaviour with the long civilising process. (17) 
Third, two values become more present in the factor after the 
changes. One is SALVATION, where the difference is small; the 
other HELPFUL, where this is a decisive break, as this value w'as 
not significantly present in the first unrotated factor before. 
Therefore, helpfulness as a value not only lost its relative 
importance, but also became a much more partisan value, 
associated with a factor that in general contains values much more 
preferred by the lower strata. In the span o f fifteen years, from 
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helpfulness became marginalised in Hungary as a specific choice 
of those people who had a more traditional outlook. (18)
The second unrotated factor gives the second greatest divide 
among the choice o f values, independently, in the sense o f a zero 
correlation, from the previous factor (see Table 4). This factor also 
shows a basic coherence through the years, with a change that 
mirrors the one that happened with the first factor. In 1978, at 
one pole, we find a combination o f the ideological and the 
traditional disciplinary values. The latter set o f values, however, 
steadily retreat from the factor, and by the 1990s, disappear 
altogether. In all four periods, the core o f the factor consists o f 
PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY, the most exposed ideological 
values o f the former system (as given in the Rokeach set); but the 
other two ideological values, EQUALITY and FREEDOM are also in, 
as there is a minor, but stable presence o f SOCIAL RECOGNITION.
The other pole o f the second unrotated factor completes the 
picture, showing the manner in which the two mixed ends-and- 
means factors o f the Communist period separated into a purely 
ends and a purely means factor. In 1978, this pole was composed 
o f intellectual and hedonistic values. The intellectual values, 
however, have already disappeared from this pole by 1982. 
Within the hedonistic values, there were two subsets. The first 
consists o f values that are hedonistic in a narrow sense, related to 
the sheer, active enjoyment o f life (EXCITING LIFE, PLEASURE, 
CHEERFUL, and to some extent HAPPINESS). The other set is also 
related to the enjoyment o f life, but refers to close interpersonal 
relations (LOVE, FRIENDSHIP). In this unrotated factor, both sets 
were present together, with HAPPINESS acting as a bridge 
between the two subsets.
The third unrotated factor defines the third major division in the 
population, uncorrelated with the first and second major divisions 
between intellectual and traditional-interpersonal instrumental 
values, and between ideological and hedonistic values (see Table 
5). This is an opposition between the inside, personality 
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materialism. One pole consists o f BEAUTY, WISDOM, and 
SALVATION. In the 1990s, joined to this pole are INNER 
HARMONY, and to some extent SELF-RESPECT. Together with 
another shift within this factor, it defines a marked change in 
profile. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the core value o f the factor is 
BEAUTY, indicating the rather aesthetic character o f the pole; 
while by the 1990s, there is a shift o f meaning toward the other 
values already contained in the factor, WISDOM and SALVATION. 
The shift, therefore, is from mere aestheticism to the more 
complex issue o f personality formation, a concern with the 
forming of oneself. This is connected but not reduced to religiosity.
The core o f other pole is a straightforward materialism, as shown 
by the continuous presence o f the values o f PLEASURE and 
especially WELL-BEING. But even here, there is a marked 
displacement. In the old regime, materialism, the emphasis on a 
pleasant life was joined with an instrumental value on the one 
hand (AMBITIOUS); and two terminal values (FAMILY and 
HAPPINESS). The first link shows a means-ends connection: in 
order to gain well-being, one has to be ambitious. By some reason, 
this link, very strong in 1978, has vanished in the 1980s, and is 
only slowly gaining importance by the 1990s. The second 
subordinates material well-being as a terminal value to a more 
basic goal, by connecting it to the strong, compact value-set o f 
FAMILY and HAPPINESS, giving a reason for the need to be 
ambitious and strive for material well-being. This is also detached 
from material well-being in the 1990s in Hungary. The two 
together defines a peculiar swing: at the moment when the 
pursuit o f material goods and well-being become self-contained, 
"auto finalised", an end in itself, not necessarily related to the joint 
well-being o f a small community, the family, it also loses its 
instrumental support. It becomes an end in itself, but left without 
acceptable means to support it.
This is an important finding, both for substantive and 
methodological reasons. The analysis o f changes in the means 
showed us that AMBITIOUS was one of the few' values for which 
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that whenever a particular value becomes more or less important 
on the average, it may entail that it also becomes more or less 
strongly related (correlated) with the other values, thus gains or 
loses force in defining the shape o f the whole value system. (19)
There is only one final point to add here. In 1990, the two most 
exposed ideological values, PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY also 
enter the pole, joining WELL-BEING, though their influence 
becomes negligible by 1993. Considering the fact that in 1978 and 
1982, they were on the opposite pole o f the first unrotated factor, 
this reflects a very huge swing, indicating either (or both) that the 
earlier ideological elite has a strong role in the definition o f the 
new, "independent" materialist factor; or that it is among the non­
elite supporters o f the former regime that material considerations, 
the loss o f previous levels o f comfort and security became the 
most acute.
5.2. The rotated factors
The unrotated factors defined the major cleavages within the 
social value system, in order o f relative importance, as measured 
by the percentage o f variance explained. With the study o f the 
rotated factors, we can get a glimpse o f a more compact set o f 
dichotomies dividing the society; a finer analysis o f the different 
subsets o f values that are present in the society, using information 
that were contained in the other factors, but that can be made 
accessible only after rotation.
The first rotated factor is close to the first unrotated, defining an 
opposition between the intellectual and interpersonal 
instrumental values for all years (see Table 6). The core o f the 
intellectual values are the same: IMAGINATIVE, LOGICAL, 
INTELLECTUAL, and CAPABLE. But two subsets that were present 
in the factor in the old regime, as indicated by their definite 
presence in 1978, leave the factor. One is the ethical values o f 
COURAGEOUS and RESPONSIBLE, known to be close to (providing 
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BROADMINDED. The explanation o f the second can only be given 
by taking all factors together. Concerning the first, we find the 
same movement as in the case o f AMBITIOUS: a strongly 
pragmatic value that leaves its factor and drops average 
importance just when the former system is losing its grip, and 
when one could expect a definite increase in its importance and 
factor-generating power. It should have become a leading value of 
the factor, and the exact opposite was happening throughout the 
1980s. Finally, just as in the case o f the role o f AMBITIOUS in the 
third unrotated factor, here also we find some regaining of 
strength by 1993.
The opposite pole contains the core instrumental values o f the 
first unrotated factor, repeating the inclusion of HELPFUL in the 
1990s. The only difference is that in this period, CLEAN and 
POLITE leave the factor, in order to form a new one.
The first rotated factor, in spite o f some internal shifts, was the 
same in all three years. In the second one, there are major 
changes (see Table 7). One o f the poles stays the same throughout: 
this is the pole o f ideological factors (PEACE, EQUALITY, 
NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM). The only small change is that the 
factor becomes "purer" already by the 1980s, and stays so: the 
values o f SOCIAL RECOGNITION and SELF-CONTROL, slightly 
present in 1978, leave it completely. At the other pole, however, 
there is a complete turnover. In the old regime, the opposition to 
ideology was provided by a specific and heterogenous set o f 
values: FAMILY, HAPPINESS, WELL-BEING, INNER HARMONY, 
LOVE and LOVING. This factor could be described as FAMILY 
being at the centre, providing a link on the other hand to WELL­
BEING and HAPPINESS, on the other hand, toward the personality 
values. Semantically, this set o f values combines the well-known 
alternative strategies to the ideology and reality o f the old regime: 
a turn toward family, close personal relations and inner 
composure against the pressures o f the system. This semantic 
reading was supported by social background findings. The values 
that proved to be very important for those university graduates 
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former party school graduates were exactly INNER HARMONY, 
WORK, FAMILY, and LOVING. (20)
If this was a coherent "silent opposition" strategy employed in the 
old regime, its importance has become already weaker by the 
1980s, and completely disappeared in the 1990s. At the opposite 
pole o f the ideological values, we Find the a different set in the 
1990s: the complete set o f hedonistic values. The core o f the pole 
consists o f the narrowly hedonistic values, oriented toward pure 
excitation and sensory pleasure (EXCITING LIFE, PLEASURE), but 
also present are the values o f interpersonal relations, LOVE and 
FRIENDSHIP.
This is the new opposite pole o f the ideological values as contained 
in the second factor in 1990 and 1993; but this is not a newly 
emerging value subsystem. Almost the same group o f values (the 
strictly hedonistic values o f EXCITING LIFE, PLEASURE, CHEERFUL) 
were also present together in 1978 and 1982 as one pole o f the 
third unrotated factor (see Table 8). The other pole o f that third 
factor was defined mostly by ideological values: PEACE, 
NATIONAL SECURITY, and an ethical value closely associated with 
them, RESPONSIBLE.
The link between hard-core ideology and ethics may seem 
difficult to understand. We have already seen a link between 
ideological and ethical values in the first unrotated factors, but 
there, one the one hand, it was a link to intellectual values, on the 
other, the whole set o f ideological values were present, including 
the more idealistic values o f FREEDOM and EQUALITY. This 
peculiar third factor can be understood by bringing in the two 
other values also present in the factor in 1978 but already 
dropping out by 1982: FAMILY and HONEST. (21)
This factor can be rendered intelligible if it is conceptualised again 
as a double-edged factor, with a bridge point. This is ethics, 
bridging ideology and the family. In the old system, on the one 
hand, there was a strong, ideological and moral emphasis on 
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ideology that explains its semantic closeness with ethics. On the 
other hand, such ethical values also have strong ties to the family. 
Finally, what this factor reflects is that in a certain way, the 
ethical commitment to family, to the provision o f a proper 
existence for family members also implied that it was necessary 
to accept, to put up with a degree o f ideology, to accommodate 
oneself in a certain way with the system. People with a family, 
especially those with a strong ethical commitment to their family 
were more easily susceptible either to be blackmailed with 
ideology, or to accept and internalise it.
This factor may have played an important role for long decades. It 
certainly had a distinct presence in 1978. But even by 1982, a 
split emerged. After the systemic change this pole o f the factor, 
that was the paradoxical, lower-class equivalent o f the family- 
centred dissident-intellectual strategy contained in the second 
factor also disappeared, and the collapse o f both made it possible 
for the two other halves o f the second and third rotated factors 
remaining "idle" (ideology and sheer hedonism) to reunite as the 
opposite poles o f a single factor.
Two o f the factors featuring in the structure o f the Hungarian 
value system before the systemic change were joined therefore 
into one; the factors that duplicated in a certain way the division 
according to ideology. This movement, however, as if in a fugue, 
had its counterpoint. In the 1990s, instead of the duplication of 
the first terminal factor, due to the preponderant influence o f 
ideological considerations, we have a duplication o f the first 
instrumental factor - due to the newly dominant role o f the 
intellectual values (see Table 9). On one pole o f the third rotated 
factor in the 1990s, we find intellectual values: especially 
IMAGINATIVE and BROADMINDED, but also CAPABLE, LOGICAL, 
and RESPONSIBLE; while on the other side, CLEAN and POLITE, and 
in 1990 also LOVING and CHEERFUL. Intellectual values took over 
the earlier role o f ideology: they are able to form in the value 
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But it is not simply the intellectual values that feature on one pole 
o f the factor, but especially high factor loading is assigned to, 
apart from IMAGINATIVE, the value that at the same time left the 
first factor: BROADMINDED. Therefore, apart from the duplication 
o f the intellectual factor, there is also a split. The fact that the 
partial duplication o f the ideological factor in 1978 and 1982 did 
not lead to the vanishing o f any of the ideological values in the 
full factor shows that this did not have to happen for 
methodological reasons. This adds to the already perceived 
peculiarities in the movements o f BROADMINDED.
The fourth rotated factor proved to be very stable through the 
fifteen years (see Table 10). On one pole, we find material WELL­
BEING as the overwhelming, dominant value defining the factor. 
Together with it, there are PLEASURE and HAPPINESS, values that 
are consistently selected together with well-being. With these 
terminal values, there are two instrumental values that are joined 
in different times, AMBITIOUS and OBEDIENT. The first is present 
until the last year, while the second only appears in the 1980s, to 
disappear in 1990 and reappear in 1993. Together, this indicates a 
strange shift: material well-being in the old regime, up to the 
1980s, was not connected to obedience, rather to being ambitious: 
but, somehow, relative weights shifted, and while the first 
connection was severed, the second was reconfirmed. This led to 
the paradoxical situation that the instrumental value most 
connected to WELL-BEING in Hungary in the 1980s and 1990s was 
not pragmatism, independence or ambition, but obedience; and 
this happened at the same time when the importance o f WELL­
BEING went drastically up, while that o f OBEDIENCE went 
decisively down. With this respect, 1990 again represented a 
temporary break on the trend. In the year o f hope, WELL-BEING 
became reconnected to AMBITIOUS, and to nothing else; but by 
1993, the general trend of the 1980s became reasserted.
At the opposite end o f materialism, one would expect to find a 
certain type o f idealism. In fact, this is the case. The idealism 
reflected on this pole, however, is different from the idealism of 
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especially BEAUTY in all four years. To these can be added the 
strong presence o f BROADMINDED in the old regime. This, 
however, more or less disappears again from the factor by 1993.
The fifth rotated factor contains on one o f its poles a homogenous 
set o f values in all four years: the social democratic values o f 
SOCIAL RECOGNITION, WORK, and SELF-RESPECT (see Table 11). 
There is no change in the composition o f this value system. In 
spite o f its declining importance, it kept its presence. The only 
small internal shift to mention concerns the very strong presence 
o f SELF-RESPECT in 1990, and its much smaller factor loading 
either in the 1980s, or by today. On the opposite pole, there is a 
major reorganisation - surprisingly at the turn o f the 1980s, and 
not the 1990s. In 1978, the social democratic values are opposed, 
in a remarkable manner, to the official socialist values o f 
NATIONAL SECURITY and especially PEACE. This finding has 
relevance for several reasons. First, because it marks, even in 
1978, a still present distinction between the official communist 
ideology and the pragmatic socialist-social democratic values 
within the population. Second, at a general level, it shows that in 
three o f the five major factors dividing the value choices o f the 
Hungarian population in 1978, the two official-ideological socialist 
values define one o f the poles, indicating the overwhelming 
presence o f this ideology in the structuration of the value system, 
whether pro or contra. Finally, this opposition disappears already 
by the 1980s: the ideological values retreat from this factor, cease 
to be the counterpart o f the ideas o f social democracy.
Their place is taken by a rather loose set o f values, dominated by 
HAPPINESS, serving again as a bridge between two different 
groups: WELL-BEING and PLEASURE on the one hand, and LOVE 
and LOVING on the other. It indicates that the social democratic 
system o f values preserved its oppositional, stoic character even 
in the 1980s and 1990; but it was not longer critical towards the - 
collapsing - socialist ideology, but rather to a perceived 
combination o f materialism and hedonism. In this context, it is 
relevant to note again a slight internal shift: LOVE left this pole in 



























































































more hopeful, and it was not an issue that provoked much 
antagonism. By 1993, it returned to the factor, and with a very 
strong presence.
So far, the changes in the five factors already present in 1978 
were analysed. In 1982, there was an additional sixth factor in the 
data (see Table 12). It was not, however, completely unrelated to 
the 1978 results, but was created by a combination o f the 
strengthening o f the personality and religious values found in 
third unrotated factor, and the separation between ideology and 
family morality. On one pole o f this new factor, there are WISDOM 
and SALVATION as the core values, and also BEAUTY, FORGIVING, 
and OBEDIENT; on the other, FAMILY and RESPONSIBLE. By the 
1980s, the latter two values got increasingly separated from 
ideology, and also took part in a quite different value-strategic 
game. (22) The stake was no longer one o f responsibility and a 
necessary (forced) allegiance with the system, or simple 
irresponsibility and hedonism, but rather the choice between two, 
equally "respectful" or "responsible" strategies: find composure in 
living for others, in a family, or in finding comfort and stability in 
the development o f one's own personality, in a strongly religious- 
Christian context. Apart from the merely negative change of the 
loss o f ideology, this also indicates a more positive development.
The opening o f a sixth factor represents an important novelty in 
the structure o f the Hungarian value system, a good sign on 
several accounts, indicating the loss o f the hold o f ideology, an 
increasing pluralism, and the formulation o f clearer and more 
distinct alternative strategies. The only perplexity concerns the 
reason why these latter had to be opposed to each other; why was 
it that a concern with responsibility towards one's family should 
be opposed by another strategy, emphasising religiosity and 
beauty. Though the ipsativity o f the Rokeach test makes it 
obligatory that preference given to one set o f values must be 
accompanied with a relative rejection o f others, it is not certain 
that all factors must have a negative pole (the necessary negative 
factor loading could well be divided, in theory', evenly and thinly 
among a large number o f values); and it is certainly not evident
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that the two strategies defined in the opposite poles o f the sixth 
factor in 1982 are in fact contradictory or exclusive o f each other. 
In fact, by 1990, the two poles o f this factor separated into a 
distinct sixth and seventh factor; and this separation was steadily 
maintained in 1993. And the fact that the meaning o f these poles 
was not at all opposite is shown by the way they separated. On 
the one hand, each pole incorporated the same value: INNER 
HARMONY; on the other, none o f them gained a distinct opposite 
pole.
The sixth rotated factor in the 1990s, then, has on one o f its side 
WISDOM, SALVATION, INNER HARMONY, and BEAUTY. The first 
two has a strong and stable presence throughout, while the 
importance of the third is increasing and o f the last is decreasing. 
We encounter the same phenomenon here as in the third 
unrotated factor: a shift within the inner-directed, personality 
oriented factor from aestheticism to inner composure. As a final 
comment, it is somewhat surprising to find that in this pole that 
contains SALVATION with such a steady and high loading, and in 
a context that makes it obvious that no possible confusion with 
salutation could have happened here, none o f the instrumental 
values that have religious connotations (FORGIVING, HELPFUL, 
LOVING) were present. Surprisingly, the loss o f connection 
between ends and means that characterised the value system of 
Hungary in the 1990s became also prevalent for the religious 
value system.
The other pole o f the factor is quite weak and difficult to join into 
a coherent sub-system; yet, it contains a stable block o f values 
both in 1990 and 1993: SOCIAL RECOGNITION, PLEASURE, and 
FREEDOM. The following explanation can be proposed. With the 
collapse o f offical atheism and materialism, there remained no 
coherent system o f values that could be opposed to this inside- 
oriented value system; only those who share these values have a 
particular resistance or resentment against those values that 
merely touch the surface but has no depth, no substance in them - 
whether these external rewards are related to society, ideology, or 
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The internal structure o f the seventh factor is similar (see Table 
13). At one pole, we have the second pole o f the sixth factor in 
1982 repeated, and in a form that represents an even clearer 
analogy with the third factor in 1978: FAMILY, HONEST, and 
RESPONSIBLE; with the only difference that INNER HARMONY is 
added even to this factor. With this, a peculiar reorganisation of 
the value system has been accomplished, a distortion o f the 
communist regime was eliminated. In the old regime, the 
importance o f family had a dual aspect. On the one hand, it was a 
crucial locus, together with other values related to inner 
composure and emotions, o f opposition to the official ideological 
value system. On the other, the need to support a family also 
required the making o f compromises, and o f a certain adjustment 
to, or living together with the system, leading to support being 
given to official ideology. The pressure o f the system for doing so 
already diminished by the 1980s, but by then, FAMILY and 
RESPONSIBILITY still were opposed to an inner-directed, 
personalisty-oriented strategy. In the new order, by the 
breakdown o f not only the official ideology but also the opposite 
strategy, FAMILY loses its double-edged character, and a single 
factor takes up both the ethical instrumental values o f family 
support, and the inner value o f composure.
The other pole o f this factor is even weaker than in the sixth, but 
still persistent, combining PLEASURE, FREEDOM, and 
IMAGINATIVE. The same comments can therefore be repeated: 
this is not a positive value system, only a joint rejection o f certain 
values. There is a considerable overlap with the previous second 
pole, but with a slight shift in meaning. The emphasis is not 
simply on exteriority, but on activity and autonomy, a type o f 
action based on momentary as opposed to long-term 
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The analysis so far centred upon the large-scale shifts in the 
selection and structure o f all the values taken together, or a 
considerable number o f them. As a final word, let us include 
something different: the in-depth assessment o f the behaviour o f 
two single values, INNER HARMONY and BROADMINDED. These 
have both theoretical and empirical interest. Theoretically, each 
represents single-handedly a crucial dimension o f the value- 
system: the relation to oneself, and the relation to others. 
BROADMINDED (OPEN-MINDED) represents in clear form the 
generalised relation to others; the presence or absence o f an open, 
tolerant attitude toward other human beings. (23) INNER 
HARMONY is the only value in the set that defines a purely 
internal relation o f the individual to himself or herself as a 
person: not linked to any external, social, intellectual, 
interpersonal, ideological, aesthetic o f ethical ends or states. 
Empirically, these are the two values that produce the most varied 
and strange moves throughout the years, concerning both their 
average selections, and their roles in the factor structure. This 
indicates that throughout the period, there were crucial shifts in 
Hungary' concerning both the relations to self, and to others.
Summarising the findings first for BROADMINDED, it gained some 
importance from 1978 to 1982, lost a great deal by 1990, and in 
1993, just regained the importance it had originally. The most 
surprising finding is the huge loss just when the systemic change 
occurred. The only other instrumental values that had a similar 
trajectory' were OBEDIENT and SELF-CONTROLLED: values that 
semantically and empirically had strong connections with the 
official-socialist ideology, and who went up in the 1980s and 
down in the 1990s together with the ideological values. It seems 
therefore that the idea to be open and tolerant toward the others 
was conceived by a considerable proportion of the population as a 
disciplinary constraint, as part of the official ideology, that is to be 
forgotten by the end of communism.
But in the factor structures, BROADMINDED was never together in 
the same factor with either the ideological or the disciplinary' 
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pragmatic values, both in the first unrotated and rotated factors; 
and was also present in the third unrotated and the fourth rotated 
factors, indicating a strong link to aestheticism and personal 
relations, as opposed to materialism. The first role is unbroken 
even in 1982, but concerning the second, there is a peculiarity: it 
disappears from the third unrotated factor. In 1990, there is a 
major and sustained change: BROADMINDED falls completely out of 
the major intellectual factors, and forms, mostly together with 
IMAGINATIVE, a new factor on its own, opposed to those values 
that define an external, traditional control over behaviour: CLEAN 
and POLITE (but not OBEDIENT). The reason may be that with the 
continuation of intellectualisation, and its opposition to the values 
o f interpersonal relations, those values that had a slightly 
different meaning, related less to sheer mental capacity and more 
openness were separated, at least partly, from the general 
intellectual factor, and were opposed only to those values from 
the opposite pole that emphasised not interpersonal relations, but 
the external control o f behaviour. As a final change, by 1993, 
BROADMINDED even dropped o f from the fourth factor, indicating 
a severing o f ties with BEAUTY.
Changes in the average ranking o f INNER HARMONY were just the 
opposite as those o f BROADMINDED. Its average value stayed 
constant in the old regime, increased considerably by 1990, only 
to fall back to the original level by 1993. In the factor structures, 
INNER HARMONY appeared in two places in 1978: as part o f the 
"opposite intellectual" strategy opposed to the ideological values in 
the second rotated factors, and as part o f the aesthetic-personality 
side o f the fourth factor together with BROADMINDED. By 1990, as 
we have seen, this pole o f the second factor disappears, and the 
value also loses importance in the fourth factor. Instead, this 
value almost single-handedly contributes now to the formation of 
both the sixth and the seventh factors, separating into different 
factors the two poles o f the sixth factor in 1982.
All this follows a consistent pattern. INNER HARMONY is a value 
much more important for Hungarians than for Americans, a result 
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explanation for this. In Hungary, this value, the composure and 
the care with oneself it represents was central for the major value 
system that was used by individuals hostile to the old regime. In 
1990, this alternative system collapsed, together with the regime, 
and the oppositional connotations o f the value also disappeared. 
INNER HARMONY, however, became even more important as a 
value itself, and became linked to both o f the new subsystems 
that became more focal and also less opposed to each other by the 
collapse o f the regime: the family-oriented and personality- 
oriented.value systems. With the formation o f these two system, 
INNER HARMONY also leaves the purely aesthetic fourth factor.
If we add the earlier findings about the selection o f HELPFUL, all 
these provide an important sub pattern for analysis o f the 
changes in the Hungarian value system in the last 15 years. The 
relation to oneself and the others; the care o f the self, and the care 
for and the openness toward others received a special impact in 
the old regime that to a large extent defines their role up till 
today. The care for the others, tolerance towards everyone, 
without respect to individual characteristics, was a central 
element o f the explicit ideology o f the former regime; but one that 
was in a certain way betrayed by its practice. Its value was 
therefore not questioned explicitly, but was subtly undermined. 
This ambivalence came to surface after the systemic changes, 
revealing strong disturbances in the value system concerning the 
relations toward others; the increasing gap between the self and 
the other. (25) The care o f the self, however, was condemned as 
egoism. Therefore, it became a conscious part o f the silent 
opposition strategies, whether in the form o f family, personal 
relations, or aestheticism. The changes elim inated the 
controversial aspect o f this value, leading to a temporary increase 
in average importance, and a sustained new role in the shaping of 
the structure o f the value system. The care o f the self therefore 
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6. Conclusion
The paper posed four questions about continuity, discontinuity, 
and reversal concerning changes in value preferences and the 
structure o f the value system in Hungary. After a detailed 
description and analysis, it is now possible to give an exhaustive 
answer to these questions.
First o f all, the results confirm the expectation that in 1978, we 
were just able to document the presence of the particular kind of 
official-socialist value system as it existed an exerted a hold over 
the population for decades. By 1982, the hold o f this system o f 
value already diminished. The singular most important element in 
this system was the overwhelming importance given to ideological 
values, represented in the Rokeach test by PEACE and NATIONAL 
SECURITY. They were selected by as the most important values in 
Hungary in such an overwhelming way that only could be 
compared to countries who were actually in war. (26) This is 
even understandable if we conceive o f communism as a 
prolongation o f W.W.II. These were also the values that 
dominated the structure o f the value system, defining one pole in 
three out o f the five existing factors.
The mere claim that ideology played a large role in the old regime 
is certainly not a novelty that requires justification. But the 
results o f the four surveys contain more information than just a 
general support or a concrete measure o f a truism. First, they 
show the preponderance played by ideological considerations - for 
or against the regime - in the structure o f the whole value system 
that is not at all self-evident. Second, the results document that 
the steady erosion o f this ideological system already started in the 
1980s, and by 1990, it has completely vanished from the value 
structure. Third, it also contains a finding that is novel and of 
crucial importance, even if the proposal has been made earlier in 
theoretical discussions. (27) Ideology not only played a large role 
in the past, but was in fact, according to our data, the cement, the 
glue, or rather the lubricator in that society, by providing the link 
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rotated factors contained both terminal and instrumental values. 
Ends and means were connected, even if this connection was made 
through adherence or opposition to the ideological values. By the 
1990s, it was not only the preponderant role o f the ideological 
values that disappeared, but the links between ends and means 
altogether. By 1993, we had seven value factors instead o f five, o f 
which ideological values were only present in one, indicating the 
increasing pluralism and crystallisation o f the value system of 
Hungary. But o f the seven factors, six contained almost exclusively 
either only terminal, or only instrumental values; and the same 
separation was characteristic o f the three basic unrotated factors. 
The only factor which preserved a mixed character was, not 
surprisingly, connected to the family. In a society where no 
connections exist between ends and means, atomisation stops only 
in the final instance before the complete dissolution o f all supra- 
individual entities: at the level o f the family. (28)
This separation between ends and means as the lasting effect of 
Communism may well be the single most important result o f our 
study. Since 1978, the official-communist value system steadily 
lost its direct influence, and by the 1990s, it has completely 
collapsed. But if left a strong legacy in the form o f a vacuum, as 
nothing has replaced it either during the long agony o f the system, 
or in its short aftermath.
The continuity in the process o f atomisation leads to the second 
question. In the 1983 report, apart from atomisation, we found 
that the Hungarian value system was also extremely 
individualised and intellectualised. While in the United States, the 
most important instrumental values, apart from the ethical values 
ranked high in all countries were the pragmatic values or the 
values o f interpersonal relations, in Hungary', these values were 
equalled or preceded by those intellectual values that in the US 
were far left behind (INTELLECTUAL, LOGICAL, IMAGINATIVE). It 
was argued that it cane be explained as the result o f the peculiar, 
forced modernisation process that happened in Hungary'. (29) 
However, another slightly different explanation can also be put 
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more as the direct effect o f the unfolding o f the inner logic o f the 
system itself. According to this view, the Party directly 
contributed to the excessive intellectualisation o f the society. In 
contradistinction to the usually assumed opposition between the 
communist party and the intellectuals, this approach conceives of 
the communist party as a party preparing the power o f 
intellectuals. (30)
The results lend more support to the second scenario, as they 
demonstrate that in the last fifteen years, in spite o f the gradual 
loosening o f the grip o f the system, the process has not 
disappeared, and was only increased even by the systemic change. 
As a consequence, as o f today, intellectual values have acquired 
almost dominance in the ranking o f instrumental values, equalling 
to or even advancing beyond the ethical values. They also single- 
handedly define the most important cleavages in the structure o f 
the value system. The process o f individualisation, atomisation, 
and intellectualisation in this extreme form may well have been 
started by the Communist Party, but it gathered a momentum on 
its own, and continues even after the demise o f its "founding 
father". Intellectual virtues are not means for certain ends in 
Hungary', but became ends in themselves concerning the value 
preferences o f the whole population; have become "auto finalised".
So far, emphasis has been laid on continuity. However, answering 
the third questions, there were also important changes in the 
value system in the 1990s; there was discontinuity. In 1990, 
ideology lost importance in average rankings and in defining the 
basic frameworks o f the structure o f the value system. The whole 
system became more pluralistic, and acquired some new profiles. 
The profile o f religious and personality values became more 
marked. The considerations about family lost their over politicised 
and ambivalent character. A number o f values connected to the 
hopes of a freer world, more relaxed, richer in human experience 
and relations gained importance and focus, as testified both by the 
average selections and the factor loading (LOVE, FAMILY, INNER 
HARMONY, HAPPINESS, WISDOM, SELF-RESPECT; or the stronger 




























































































also some less positive signs, such as the sudden importance 
gained by material WELL-BEING, in both average selections and in 
factor loading; or the huge losses o f importance in values that may 
have been compromised in the former regime, but that could have 
been reconsidered on their own right (SELF-CONTROLLED, 
EQUALITY, SOCIAL RECOGNITION).
But the most disquieting sign concerns a certain definite retreat 
from the changes o f 1990 by 1993; and this at once gives the 
answer to the fourth question posed at the beginning. First o f all, 
ideology again gained importance, even reaching a level beyond 
the documented communist years, though as yet this change had 
no impact on the structure o f the value system. Shifts in the 
relative importance o f the two values o f PEACE and NATIONAL 
SECURITY proved to be reliable indicators in the past o f a 
sensivity within the population at large for increasing external 
threats in the form o f a hardening o f the official line, with the 
potential consequences concerning the conduct o f life. (31) The 
huge gains between 1990 and 1993 point out this potential.
But this is not the only similar change. Though the major structure 
o f the value system remained unchanged between 1990 and 
1993, all those small signs that pointed out the hopes o f 1990 
were reversed. LOVE and INNER HARMONY resumed their earlier 
value, and there was a swing back in FAMILY and HAPPINESS as 
well; and many o f the noted small changes within the factor 
structures were also reversed.
The fundamental structural characteristics o f the value system in 
Hungary, to repeat, stayed the same in 1993 as in 1990 and 
different from the 1980s and especially the 1970s, reflecting the 
mutual links between the systemic change and changes in values, 
and specifying their exact modality. But much o f the signs 
promising that 1990 may have been not only the grave o f the 
moribund old regime, but also the starting point o f a new and 
healthy development, with novel connections between ends and 
means, have disappeared, and the strong latent effects o f the 





























































































(1) For a comprehensive report o f the early findings, see Elemer 
Hankiss, Robert Manchin, Laszlo Fiistos, and Arpad Szakolczai, 
'Kenyszerpalyan? (On a Forced Track? An Analysis o f the Value 
System o f Hungarian Society, 1930-1978). Research report, 
Institute o f Sociology, Hungarian Academy o f Sciences, 1983.
(2) See Milton Rokeach, The Nature o f Human Values (N.Y., The 
Free Press, 1973); Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution 
(Princeton University Press, 1974); and Stephen Harding and 
David Phillips, with Michael Fogarty, Contrasting Values in 
Western Europe: Unity, Diversity, and Change (London, Macmillan, 
1986); Melvin L. Cohn, Class and Conformity': A Study in Values, 
2nd ed (Chicago, The University o f Chicago Press, 1977).
(3) For relevant publications, see Elemer Hankiss, Robert 
Manchin, Laszlo Fiistos, and Arpad Szakolczai, "Continuity and 
Break: the Analysis o f the Value System o f Hungarian Society, 
1930-1978", research report, Institute o f Sociology, Hungarian 
Academy o f Sciences, 1982; Hankiss et al„ Interactions between 
socio-economic factors, ways of life, and value orientations', 
research report, UNESCO, 1982; E. Hankiss, Diagnozisok I 
(Diagnoses) (Budapest, Magveto, 1982), and Diagnozisok II 
(Diagnoses) (Budapest, Magveto, 1986); R. Manchin, 'Individual 
Economic Strategies and Social Consciousness', Social Research 55 
(1988), 1-2: 77-95; A. Szakolczai, 'A ciganysag ertekrendjenek 
sajatossagai' (The specificities o f the value system o f gypsies), 
Szociologia , 1982, no.4; 'On the characteristics o f the value choices 
of students', in Ildiko Hrubos (ed.), The Social Conditions of 
Engineers and Economists (Budapest, Department o f Sociology, 
University o f Economics, 1987); Hankiss et al„ 'Modernization of 
Value Systems: Indicators o f Change in Cross-cultural 
Comparisons', in Ilona Kovacs (ed.), Search for American Values: 
Contribution o f Hungarian Americans to American Values 
(Budapest, Orszagos Szechenyi Konyvtar, 1990).
(4) Such a connection between objective knowledge and the 
proper conduct o f life was central for the whole undertaking o f 
Descartes. Thus he starts his essay on Optics, the first o f the three 
essays to which his Discourse on the Method was written as a 
Preface with the following words: "The conduct o f our life depends 
entirely on our senses, and since sight is the noblest and most 
comprehensive o f the senses, inventions which serve to increase 
its power are undoubtedly among the most useful there can be." 
See The Philosophical Writings o f Descartes (Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p.152.
(5) Thus, a report by an American think tank on the recent 
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Hungary now] is not so much the country's lack o f development 
but its self-inflicted misdirection" (see 'US group: Magyar 
democracy in crisis', Budapest Week 3 (November 11-17, 1993), 
36:3). The crucial question is not simply whether this assessment 
is correct or not, but the reasons that made such a serious 
statement possible. And these reasons evidently have to do with 
values and subjective cosiderations, not interests and other 
objective factors.
(6) See Rokeach, 1973, and also M. Rokeach (ed.), Understanding 
Human Values: Individual and Societal (N.Y., Free Press, 1979): 
and 'Inducing Change and Stability in Belief Systems and 
Personality Structures', Journal o f Social Issues 41 (1985), 1:153- 
171.
(7) The total number o f cases for the four years were 807, 2938, 
1320, and 1538 respectively. Those who filled out completely the 
tests were 697, 2168, 1082, and 1184 in the four samples. The 
percentage o f missing values is therefore quite high. This is 
inevitable for such a complex test. But the sample bias was very 
weak according to the major variables (education, occupation, 
residence, gender, age). Therefore, in our view, the small 
distortion in the sample is more than compensated by the richness 
o f the results; because, as a methodological exercise done in 1992 
using the child-rearing set o f the EVSSG has shown, the complete 
ranking provides much finer results than the mere selection o f the 
first 5, 6, or 8 most important values.
(8) Rokeach is always using the median and not the mean in 
order to measure average preference. This is in fact the correct 
way to proceed with ordinal data. However, because o f the large 
number of cases in our data, and the implicit use o f means for all 
multivariate methods (factor or cluster analysis), we decided to 
use the means. It was also supported by the fact that there was no 
perceivable difference between the results obtained by means or 
medians.
(9) Throughout the paper, the word "significant" will imply 
statistical significance.
(10) This was corroborated by the results o f the child-rearing 
principles test obtained for 1982, 1990, and 1992. In all three 
years, "religious faith" was selected only by a few respondents 
(below 20 %), with no major shifts.
(11) Adding everything together, the changes reached a .10 
significance level between 1978 and 1993.
(12) See Hankiss et al, 1983.
(13) Thus, while the median value for the total sample was in 
1978 2.5 and 5.9 for PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY, 
respectively, for those who also finished a party school, it was 1.9 
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members, it was 4.6 and 8.0. Here, because o f the smaller number 
o f cases for the subgroups, in line with the established usage, we 
used median instead of mean. See Szakolczai, 1987.
(14) For easy and short introductions to factor analysis, see Jae- 
On Kim and Charles W. Mueller, Introduction to Factor Analysis 
(Beverly Hills, Sage, 1978), and Kim and Charles W. Mueller, Factor 
Analysis (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1978).
(15) Such a choice was supported by all possible criteria. First, in 
case o f all four time periods, the scree curve flattened almost 
completely by the next possible factor. Second, in this way, for all 
years, the principal components used in the factor model had an 
eigenvalue above 1.30, and the actual factors all had an 
eigenvalue remaining above 0.60. In other words, had we used 
these "objective" criteria for setting limits on the factors, we 
would have arrived to exactly the same factor structure as on the 
basis o f the scree curve.
(16) The exact numbers for the four years are 22.2%, 21.5%, 
26.2%, and 23.6% respectively. In the later years, the variance 
explained is higher because there are more factors, though this is 
somewhat compensated by the declining eigenvalue o f the first 
factor (this value for the four years is 3.16, 2.78, 2.59, 2.33). The 
reason for this decline will be apparent by the concrete analysis. 
The fact that the percentage o f variance explained is by far the 
highest in 1990 seems to indicate a peculiar crystallisation of the 
value system in that year.
(17) About this, see Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1978); and also Philippe Ariès, L'Enfant et la vie 
familiale sous l'Ancien Régime (Paris, Seuil, 1973): Michel 
Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris, Gallimard, 1975); Albert O. 
Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for 
Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton University Press, 1977); 
Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
(18) The first unrotated factor in the 1968 American sample was 
similar, but with certain characteristic differences. First, the 
terminal values found together with the intellectual and 
pragmatic values on one o f the poles were not the ideological 
values, but WORK, WISDOM, and INNER HARMONY; and the core 
values o f the other pole were not so much the instrumental values 
related to interpersonal relations (FORGIVING, LOVING), but 
CLEAN, POLITE, and CHEERFUL.
(19) For similar shifts, see the changes in WISDOM, INNER 
HARMONY, or PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY.
(20) For the data, see Szakolczai, 1987.
(21) The strong link empirically existing between these two 



























































































-  35 -
where in both 1977 and 1982, educating for honesty and the love 
and respect for family were always strongly correlated, and 
formed a separate factor.
(22) It should be mentioned that in 1982, there was still a link 
between ideology and family-responsibility in two factors.
(23) The importance o f this value within the whole test is 
evident, as Rokeach even published a book by that title. See his 
The Open and the Closed Mind (N.Y., Basic Books, 1960).
(24) Its median value in the Hungarian sample in 1978 was 8.42, 
while in the United States in 1968 was 10.46.
(25) This was also one o f the major conclusions o f another article, 
analysis the attitudes o f mayors within the concrete context o f 
their work in Hungary and the former Czecho-Slovakia in 1992. 
See A. Szakolczai, 'Types o f Mayors, Types o f Subjectivity: 
Continuity and Discontinuity in the East-Central European 
Transitions 1', EUI Working Papers, 1993/5, pp. 115-117.
(26) This was the case for Israel in the 1970s; see Rokeach, 1979.
(27) See Vaclav Havel, The Power of the Powerless (Ed. John 
Keane), (London, Hutchinson, 1985), pp.31-2.
(28) This can again be supported by a similar finding from the 
study of mayors, where it was shown that the only strong 
cleavage within the new local councils was not along ideological or 
national political lines, but along the different areas 
(neighborhoods) within the same locality. See A. Szakolczai, 'Re- 
Building the Polity: A Comparative Study o f Mayors in the 
Hungarian, Czech and Slovakian Republics', EUI Working Papers, 
1993/8, pp. 27-9.
(29) See Hankiss et al. 1983.
(30) For the original theoretical statement, see George Konrad and 
Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (N.Y., 
Harcourt, 1979). For an empirical studies confirming the 
intellectualisation of the communist party apparatus, see 
references to an empirical study o f the party apparatus done in 
the ;ate 1980s in Poland in Jadviga Staniszkis, The Dynamics o f 
Breakthrough in Eastern Europe, (Berkeley, University o f 
California Press, 1991); and Agnes Horvath and Arpad Szakolczai: 
The Dissolution o f Communist Power The Case o f in Hungary 
(London, Routledge, 1992).
(31) As a proof, let us mention the following evidence. At the 
turn o f 1979-1980, we were administering the Rokeach survey on 
a subsample o f about 400 individuals. Half o f the questionnaires 
were accidentally filled out before Afghanistan, half after. The 
only two values with a major difference were exactly PEACE and 
NATIONAL SECURITY, fully explaining the difference found 




























































































T ab le  1. T h e  Rokeach test
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A. Terminal values
1. A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)
* (In Hungary: MATERIAL WELL-BEING)
2. A WORLD OF PEACE (free of war and conflict)
3. HAPPINESS (contentedness)
4. WISDOM (a mature understanding o f life)
5. FAMILY SECURITY (taking care o f the loved ones)
6. INNER HARMONY ( freedom from inner conflict)
7. EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
8. A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
* (In Hungary: THE JOY OF WELL-DONE WORK)
9. AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
10. NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
11. TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
12. MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
13. PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
14. SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
15. FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
16. A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty o f nature and the art)
17. SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
18. SALVATION (saved, eternal life)
B. Instrumental values
19. IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative)
20. COURAGEOUS (standing up for your beliefs)
21. BROADMINDED (open-minded)
22. OBEDIENT (dutiful, respectful)
23. INTELLECTUAL (intelligent, reflexive)
24. SELF-CONTROLLED (restrained, self-disciplined)
* (In Hungary: DISCIPLINED)
25. RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
26. CAPABLE (competent, effective)
27. CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful)
28. LOGICAL (consistent, rational)
29. FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
30. INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
31. HELPFUL (working for the welfare o f others)
32. HONEST (sincere, truthful)
33. LOVING (affectionate, tender)
34. CLEAN (neat, tidy)
35. AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
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1978 1982 1990 1993 ANOVA t-tests
T a b le  2. T h e  ave rage  ran k in g  fo r  each v a lu e
1. WELL-BEING 8.2 8.7 6.8 6.5 .001 a? b c e f
2. PEACE 4.4 3.9 4.9 3.7 .001 a b c d? f
3. HAPPINESS 6.9 7.6 6.0 6.2 .001 a b d e f
4. WISDOM 13.1 12.7 12.2 11.3 .001 a? b c d e f
5. FAMILY SEC. 5.2 5.3 3.9 4.6 .001 b c d e f
6. INNER HARMONY 8.9 8.7 7.5 8.4 .001 b c d f ?
7. EQUALITY 9.4 9.1 11.2 10.7 .001 b c d e f
8. WORK 7.7 8.2 8.7 9.8 .001 a b c d e f
9. EXCITING LIFE 11.7 11.9 11.7 11.9 n.s.
10. NATIONAL SEC. 7.4 6.8 8.1 6.6 .001 a b c d f
11. TRUE FRIENDSHIP 9.4 8.9 9.2 9.1 .05 a
12. MATURE LOVE 10.3 10.7 9.7 10.6 .001 a? b c d
13. PLEASURE 11.8 11.9 11.6 12.0 n.s. c?
14. SELF-RESPECT 9.6 9.6 9.9 10.5 .001 b? c e f
15. FREEDOM 8.7 8.8 9.1 9.0 n.s.
16. BEAUTY 13.9 13.6 14.2 14.0 .001 bd ? e
17. SOCIAL RECOGN. 8.8 9.2 11.1 10.5 .001 a? b c d e f
18. SALVATION 15.8 15.5 15.4 15.7 n.s. d?
19. IMAGINATIVE 10.9 10.9 10.7 10.1 .001 c e f
20. COURAGEOUS 7.2 7.4 7.3 7.4 n.s.
21. BROADMINDED 10.4 9.9 10.7 10.4 .001 a? b e
22. OBEDIENT 10.9 10.5 11.1 11.6 .001 b c ? e f
23. INTELLECTUAL 8.3 7.6 7.4 6.4 .001 a c d e f
24. SELF-CONTROLLED 9.2 8.2 9.1 9.0 .001 a b e
25. RESPONSIBLE 6.9 7.3 7.2 7.2 n.s. a?
26. CAPABLE 11.4 11.6 11.4 11.2 n.s. e?
27. CHEERFUL 9.9 10.3 9.8 10.2 n.s. b? c?
28. LOGICAL 10.9 10.3 10.2 9.3 .001 a c d e f
29. FORGIVING 11.0 11.2 11.2 11.4 n.s.
30. INDEPENDENT 9.1 10.1 9.7 10.0 .001 a b? d f
31. HELPFUL 7.9 8.7 9.0 9.2 .001 a d e f
32. HONEST 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.7 n.s.
33. LOVING 10.2 11.0 10.0 10.2 .001 a b e
34. CLEAN 10.0 9.2 9.4 9.7 .001 a d? e
35. AMBITIOUS 9.5 10.8 10.5 10.8 .001 a d  f
36. POLITE 10.8 9.8 9.7 10.4 .001 a c d e
- ANOVA is a variance test for all years taken together;
- the small latters for t-tests indicate significant changes 
between single years in the following way: a: 1978-82, b: 1982- 
90, c: 1990-93, d: 1978-90, e: 1982-93, f: 1978-93; ? mark: .05 
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Table 3. The first unrotated factor
1978 1982 1990
IMAGINATIVE .53 .53 .59
LOGICAL .41 .50 .55
CAPABLE .29 .42 .49
INTELLECTUAL .28 .26 .37
BROADMINDED .30 .41 .17
INDEPENDENT .36 .17 .23
COURAGEOUS .29 .22 .17
RESPONSIBLE .33 .31 .15
FREEDOM .39 .20 .08
EQUALITY .20 .20 - .15
NATIONAL SEC .38 .25 - .14
PEACE .34 .21 - .20
SOCIAL RECOGN .23 .12 .01
WELL-BEING - .28 - .21 .08
PLEASURE - .37 - .24 .07
HAPPINESS - .32 - .28 - .05
CHEERFUL - .36 - .38 - .16
SALVATION - .25 - .20 - .36
HELPFUL - .17 - .15 - .37
OBEDIENT - .41 - .38 - .40
CLEAN - .44 - .43 - .36
POLITE - .43 - .44 - .38
LOVING - .47 - .46 - .43




















































































































T ab le  4, T h e  second  u n ro tated  factor
1978 1982 1990 1993
NATIONAL SEC .55 .48 .53 .52
PEACE .50 .46 .45 .42
FREEDOM .30 .28 .29 .34
EQUALITY .30 .34 .28 .38
SOCIAL RECOGN .17 .29 .24 .24
SELF-CONTROLLED .23 .10 .20 .16
POLITE .35 .12 - .21 .04
CLEAN .35 .00 - .18 - .05
OBEDIENT .33 .29 - .09 .21
CAPABLE - .28 - .09 .13 - .12
LOGICAL - .28 - .23 .03 - .12
IMAGINATIVE - .33 - .17 .06 - .26
FRIENDSHIP - .20 - .16 - .24 - .25
LOVE - .25 - .43 - .36 - .46
HAPPINESS - .10 - .25 - .42 - .24
CHEERFUL - .19 - .17 - .43 - .19
PLEASURE - .28 - .29 - .54 - .35
EXCITING LIFE - .32 - .30 - .45 - .39
Table 5. The third unrotated factor
1978 1982 1990 1993
BEAUTY .39 .34 .30 .27
WISDOM .24 .20 .20 .39
SALVATION .15 .32 .19 .32
INNER HARMONY .12 - .05 .33 .31
SELF-RESPECT .11 .19 .33 .18
BROADMINDED .24 - .02 .13 .23
FORGIVING .21 .12 .18 .17
FAMILY - .22 - .41 .20 - .05
HAPPINESS - .20 - .32 - .09 - .03
AMBITIOUS - .34 .03 - .15 - .23
PLEASURE - .21 .05 - .23 - .36
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T ab le  6. T h e  first ro tated  factor
1978 1982 1990
IMAGINATIVE .59 .55 .49
LOGICAL .48 .51 .61
CAPABLE .40 .44 .35
INTELLECTUAL .34 .27 .42
BROADMINDED .24 .32 - .01
INDEPENDENT .44 .23 .23
COURAGEOUS .19 .24 .12
RESPONSIBLE .24 .17 .06
SALVATION - .31 - .29 - .38
HELPFUL - .15 - .26 - .35
OBEDIENT - .52 - .39 - .50
CLEAN - .52 - .37 - .14
POLITE - .54 - .40 - .18
LOVING - .33 - .43 - .35
FORGIVING - .49 - .51 - .53
Table 7. The second rotated factor
1978 1982 1990
FREEDOM .49 .45 .34
EQUALITY .43 .37 .28
NATIONAL SEC .43 .52 .71
PEACE .30 .50 .64
SOCIAL RECOGN .32 .17 .04
SELF-CONTROLLED .22 .03 .06
FAMILY - .43 - .29 - .06
HAPPINESS - .33 - .38 - .26
INNER HARMONY - .28 - .20 - .12
LOVE - .28 - .28 - .26
LOVING - .36 - .13 - .13
WELL-BEING - .28 - .15 - .16
FRIENDSHIP - .14 - .11 - .21
CHEERFUL - .20 - .12 - .23
PLEASURE - .16 - .23 - .40




























































































































T a b le  8. T h e  th ird  ro tated  factor, v ersion  A
1978 1982 1990 1993
PEACE .46 .29




CHEERFUL - .39 - .35
PLEASURE - .47 - .36
EXCITING LIFE - .44 - .31
Table 9. The third rotated factor, version B






LOVING - .30 - .18
CHEERFUL - .43 - .24
CLEAN - .49 - .64
POLITE - .49 - .48
Table 10. The fourth rotated factor
1978 1982 1990 1993
WELL-BEING .56 .45 .34 .62
HAPPINESS .23 .07 .08 .26
PLEASURE .32 .26 .00 .20
AMBITIOUS .39 .31 .43 .15
OBEDIENT .17 .34 .06 .23
WISDOM - .24 - .17 - .01 - .07
LOVE - .12 - .19 - .24 - .20
FRIENDSHIP - .17 - .13 - .32 - .08
INNER HARMONY - .19 - .26 - .12 - .18
BROADMINDED - .33 - .28 - .34 - .12
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T ab le  11. T h e  fifth  rotated  factor
1978 1982 1990
SOCIAL RECOGN .28 .53 .41
WORK .36 .30 .37
SELF-RESPECT .33 .24 .42
PEACE - .46 - .17
NATIONAL SEC - .30 - .05
CLEAN - .24 .00
CHEERFUL - .23 - .17
LOVING - .09 - .17
LOVE - .20 - .23
WELL-BEING - .28 - .44
PLEASURE - .12 - .35
HAPPINESS - .38 - .43






OBEDIENT .20 - .04
INNER HARMONY - .03 .16
PEACE - .17 .00























































































































T a b le  13. T h e  seventh  ro tated  fac to r




INNER HARMONY .38 .29
PLEASURE - .21 - .27
FREEDOM - .16 - .13
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